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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-4575 
 ___________ 
 
RONG QUAN ZHENG, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A070-578-452) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable William K. Strasser 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 26, 2012 
 Before:  AMBRO, ALDISERT and NYGAARD, Circuit 
 
Judges 







 Rong Quan Zheng petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
(“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen his proceeding.  We will deny the petition. 
I. 
  Zheng is a citizen of China who entered the United States without valid 
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documents in 1992.  He conceded removability for that reason but sought asylum and 
other relief on the ground that the Chinese government forcibly sterilized him because he 
fathered a third child in violation of China’s family planning policy.  The Immigration 
Judge (“IJ”) denied his applications and ordered his removal to China in 2003.  In 
particular, the IJ found Zheng not credible and raised questions regarding the authenticity 
of his supporting documents.  The BIA dismissed Zheng’s appeal, and we denied his 
petition for review.  See Rong Quan Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 169 F. App’x 111 (3d Cir. 
2006).  In doing so, we found no basis to disturb the IJ’s adverse credibility 
determination and agreed that “the record demonstrates legitimate questions regarding the 
authenticity of Zheng’s supporting documents[.]”  Id. at 113.  We also agreed that 
Zheng’s claim of sterilization was contradicted by medical evidence “showing a normal 
sperm count.”  
 In 2011, Zheng filed a motion to reopen with the BIA, which is the motion at issue 
here.  Zheng claimed, in relevant part, that he began practicing Falun Gong in 2010 while 
in the United States and that conditions for Falun Gong practitioners in China have 
deteriorated since his last hearing.  He also claimed that someone from his hometown 
witnessed him practicing Falun Gong in the United States and so informed the Chinese 
government, which intends to punish him if he is retuned.  To support that claim, he 
submitted what purports to be a Changle City Village Committee notice to his mother in 
China.  (A.R. 120.)  The notice orders Zheng’s mother to urge him to cease his Falun 
Gong activities and return to China to “accept the stern sanction of the government.”  It 




“severe punishment.”  In addition to this notice, Zheng submitted what purports to be a 
statement from his mother (he refers to it as an affidavit, but it is not sworn) describing a 
visit by Chinese officials to deliver this notice.  (A.R. 126-30.)  Zheng argued that both 
the deteriorating conditions in China and the Chinese government’s awareness of his 
activities in the United States constitute changed country conditions permitting the filing 
of his motion to reopen, which would otherwise be untimely because he had not filed it 
within 90 days of his order of removal.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), (ii).1
 The BIA rejected Zheng’s reliance on changed country conditions and denied his 
motion to reopen as untimely.  In addressing that issue, it first explained that it would not 
give “much weight” to the village notice and Zheng’s mother’s statement because the IJ 
previously questioned the veracity of documents that Zheng submitted in support of his 
prior claim.  The BIA acknowledged Zheng’s argument that it is difficult to obtain 
authentication of foreign documents, but it noted that Zheng had offered no other 
evidence of their reliability and it declined “to overlook this deficiency where there has 
been a prior adverse credibility determination.”  The BIA also concluded that Zheng did 
not show changed country conditions because “[t]he limited country information 
proffered with the instant motion does not reflect changed conditions in China for Falun 
Gong supporters that materially affect [Zheng’s] eligibility for relief.”  Zheng petitions 
 
                                                 
1 Zheng also claimed that the Chinese government will discover that his sterilization was 
not successful and will forcibly sterilize him “again.”  In addition, he raised numerous 
arguments addressed to the IJ’s previous adverse credibility determination as well as 
allegations concerning his prior counsel’s performance.  The BIA addressed those 
arguments but, because Zheng has limited his arguments on review to his Falun Gong 






 Zheng raises three issues on review, but each lacks merit.  First, Zheng argues that 
his evidence of country conditions in China shows that the situation for Falun Gong 
practitioners has deteriorated since the time of his hearing in 2003.  Zheng relies for this 
point on (1) the 2007 Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions for China (A.R. 
132-92), and (2) three newspaper articles relating to assaults on Falun Gong practitioners 
by Chinese immigrants in Flushing, New York (A.R. 194-206).   Zheng challenges both 
the BIA’s discussion of this evidence and the substance of its conclusion that this 
evidence does not show changed country conditions.   
 We agree with Zheng that the BIA’s treatment of this evidence was rather cursory 
because the BIA neither identified nor expressly discussed it.  The BIA need not discuss 
all of a petitioner’s specific evidence, however, and generally need only “demonstrate 
that it has considered such evidence” in a manner that allows us to “discern its reasons for 
declining to afford relief.”  Jian Zhau Zheng, 549 F.3d at 268 (quoting Wei Guang Wang 
v. BIA
                                                 
2 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we review the denial of 
reopening for abuse of discretion.  See Jian Zhau Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 
264-65 (3d Cir. 2008)  (citing Jian Lian Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 
2004)).  We will not disturb the BIA’s ruling unless it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary 
to law.”  Id. at 265 (quotation marks omitted) (citing Jian Lian Guo, 386 F.3d at 562).  
We review the BIA’s underlying assessment of the record for substantial evidence and 
may not disturb it unless “‘any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to 
the contrary.’”  Ying Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2009) (INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992); quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). 
, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006)).  Although cursory, the BIA’s discussion was 
sufficient given the record presented here.     
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 Zheng argues that his evidence shows that persecution of Falun Gong practitioners 
has intensified since 2003.  In fact, however, the 2007 Profile describes a nationwide 
crackdown against Falun Gong that began in 1999 (A.R. 142), and states only that this 
campaign “continued” in 2004 and 2005 (A.R. 141), not that it has worsened in any way.  
And Zheng’s articles regarding attacks on Falun Gong practitioners in the United States 
say nothing about conditions in China.  (A.R. 197-206.)  Under these circumstances, the 
BIA did not abuse its discretion by failing to explicitly discuss this evidence.  Cf. Jian 
Zhau Zheng, 549 F.3d at 286 (explaining that the BIA has a duty to “explicitly consider 
any country conditions evidence submitted by an applicant that materially bears on his 
claim”) (emphasis added) (quoting Shou Yung Guo v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 109, 115 (2d 
Cir. 2006); citing Tu Kai Yang v. Gonzales
 Zheng’s second and third arguments are related.  Zheng argues that the BIA erred 
in denying reopening on the ground that his practice of Falun Gong constitutes a changed 
personal circumstance, rather than a changed country condition, because the Chinese 
government’s 
, 427 F.3d 1117, 1122 (8th Cir. 2005)).  Nor 
does this evidence compel the conclusion that conditions in China have changed. 
awareness
 We reject these arguments.  Contrary to Zheng’s assertion, the BIA did not deny 
 of his Falun Gong activities constitutes a change of “conditions” 
in China.  He also argues that the BIA erred in rejecting the documents he submitted in 
support of this claim—i.e., the village committee notice and the statement from his 
mother.  Zheng argues that the BIA abused its discretion by rejecting this evidence on the 




reopening because it deemed his practice of Falun Gong a change in personal 
circumstances and did not mention the issue of changed personal circumstances at all.3  
Also contrary to Zheng’s assertion, the BIA did not reject these documents solely for lack 
of authentication.  Instead, it explained that it gave them little weight because the IJ 
questioned the veracity of the documents that Zheng submitted in support of his previous 
claim, questioning that we agreed was “legitimate.”  Rong Quan Zheng
 Nor did the BIA err in relying on the IJ’s prior adverse credibility determination, 
which it did as its reason for declining to overlook the deficiency just discussed.  Zheng 
, 169 F. App’x at 
113.  Zheng does not address that issue in his brief.  The BIA went on to “acknowledge 
[Zheng’s] arguments regarding the difficulty of obtaining authentication of government 
documents,” but it explained that “no evidence of the reliability of the documents has 
been offered.”  Zheng characterizes this reasoning as arbitrary or irrational, but we cannot 
say that it is.  Zheng does not argue that he in fact submitted any objective evidence 
bolstering the reliability of his mother’s statement or the village notice and the record 
discloses none.  Under the circumstances, we cannot fault the BIA for requiring 
something more. 
                                                 
3 We note with concern that this is at least the second case in which Zheng’s counsel has 
argued that the BIA erred in denying a claim on the ground that it was based merely on 
personal circumstances even though “the BIA made no reference to [petitioner’s] 
personal circumstances in its decision.”  Ji Xian Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 404 F. App’x 698, 
700 (3d Cir. 2010) (not precedential).  It may well have been permissible for the BIA to 
deny reopening for this reason, see Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 497-98 (3d Cir. 
2012), as we have concluded in other cases in which Zheng’s counsel filed motions to 
reopen on the basis of evidence and allegations strikingly similar to those presented here, 
see, e.g., Xiu Bin Zhu v. Att’y Gen., 372 F. App’x 306, 308-09 (3d Cir. 2010) (not 




argues that the BIA did so in violation of Jian Lian Guo, but we reject that argument.  In 
the first place, Zheng himself raised the issue of his prior adverse credibility 
determination in his motion to reopen.  Although Zheng asked the BIA not to hold the 
adverse credibility determination against him as to his new Falun Gong claim, he did not 
rely on Jian Lian Guo or argue as he does now that the BIA was not permitted
 Moreover, 
 to do so.  
(A.R. 56-57.)  To the contrary, he explained that he had included numerous arguments 
addressed to the IJ’s previous adverse credibility determination, not by way of seeking 
reconsideration of that issue, but because the prior credibility determination “would 
directly affect the credibility of [his] affidavit submitted for this motion and other 
relevant corroborating evidence.”  (A.R. 46 ¶ 8.)  We deem Zheng’s arguments before the 
BIA sufficient for exhaustion purposes, but we decline to hold that the BIA abused its 
discretion in relying on what Zheng expressly stated was a relevant consideration. 
Jian Lian Guo is distinguishable.  In that case, the BIA denied 
reopening to assert a family-planning claim on the basis of the IJ’s adverse credibility 
determination in connection with a previous religious persecution claim.  We held that 
the BIA erred in relying on the adverse credibility determination because “the basis for 
the IJ’s credibility assessment was utterly unrelated to [petitioner’s] later claim.”  Jian 
Lian Guo
 Zheng previously claimed that he had been sterilized for violating China’s family 
planning policy, and the IJ found his testimony not credible.  Both the letter from 
Zheng’s mother and the village committee notice on which Zheng bases his Falun Gong 
, 386 F.3d at 562.  We cannot say the same here because, as the BIA explained, 
Zheng’s current and former claims are “somewhat entwined.”   
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claim recite those same underlying allegations.  (A.R. 120, 127, 129.)  Moreover, both 
documents suggest that Zheng’s prior alleged violation of the family planning policy is 
part of the reason that the Chinese government would target him for punishment for 
practicing Falun Gong.  (A.R. 120, 129.)  In addition, Zheng alleges in his motion to 
reopen, his supporting affidavit and his successive asylum application that it was in part 
his forced sterilization and fear of additional persecution for violating the family planning 
policy that led him to begin practicing Falun Gong in the first place.  (A.R. 40 ¶ 1, 68 ¶ 
22, 94.)  Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the BIA abused its discretion in 
relying on the IJ’s prior adverse credibility determination, together with the questionable 
nature of Zheng’s previous documents, as reasons for requiring some proof that his 
documents were reliable.  Cf. Khan, 691 F.3d at 497 (holding that the BIA appropriately 
considered prior adverse credibility determination in denying reopening where there was 
a sufficient nexus between that determination and the BIA’s holding).4
 For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
                                                 
4 We note that our ruling in this regard does not conflict with our non-precedential 
decision in Yong Gui Wang v. Att’y Gen., 385 F. App’x. 187, 189-90 (3d Cir. 2010).  In 
that case, we held that the BIA had indeed erred under Jian Lian Guo by relying on a 
prior adverse credibility determination to reject documents later submitted in support of a 
motion to reopen (though we ultimately denied the petition for review on other grounds).  
The motion to reopen in that case, however, asserted claims that were wholly unrelated to 
the petitioner’s prior claim, see id. at 188, 190, and there was no discussion in that case of 
the petitioner having a history of submitting questionable documents. 
